Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 29 septembre 2026, n° P16-2026-001

GRAND CHAMBER

ADVISORY OPINION

on the proportionality of a tax fine calculated at a statutorily fixed rate

Requested by

Ukraine’s Supreme Court

(Request no. P16-2026-001)

STRASBOURG

29 September 2026

This opinion is final. It may be subject to editorial revision.

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Mattias Guyomar, President,

Arnfinn Bårdsen

Ivana Jelić

Lado Chanturia

Ioannis Ktistakis

Kateřina Šimáčková

Lәtif Huseynov

Jovan Ilievski

Raffaele Sabato

Lorraine Schembri Orland

Anja Seibert-Fohr

Diana Sârcu

Mykola Gnatovskyy

Anne Louise Bormann

András Jakab

Anna Adamska-Gallant

Vasilka Sancin, judges,

and of John Darcy, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 2 September 2026,

Delivers the following opinion, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  By a letter of 18 December 2025 to the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), Ukraine’s Supreme Court submitted a request under Article 1 of Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Protocol No. 16” and “the Convention”) for an advisory opinion on the questions set out below.

2.  The request, submitted in Ukrainian and accompanied by an English translation provided by Ukraine’s Supreme Court, was received at the Court by post on 7 January 2026. In keeping with the Court’s practice, it is considered to have been formally lodged on that date.

3.  On 16 February 2026 a panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber, composed in accordance with Article 2 § 3 of Protocol No. 16 and Rule 93 § 1 of the Rules of Court, decided to accept the request.

4.  On 17 February 2026 the Grand Chamber was constituted in accordance with Rule 24 § 2 (g) and Rule 94 § 1.

5.  The parties to the domestic proceedings were invited by the President of the Grand Chamber to submit written comments on the request for an advisory opinion (Article 3 of Protocol No. 16 and Rule 94 § 3). The OvruchHazAvto company made use of that possibility.

6.  The Ukrainian Government and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights decided not to exercise their right to intervene in the proceedings (Article 3 of Protocol No. 16).

7.  A copy of the submissions received was transmitted to the Supreme Court, which did not avail itself of the opportunity to comment on them (Rule 94 § 6).

8.  After the close of the written procedure, the President of the Grand Chamber decided that no oral hearing should be held (Rule 94 § 6).

THE QUESTIONS ASKED

9.  The questions asked by Ukraine’s Supreme Court in its request for an advisory opinion were worded as follows:

“(1)  In view of the mandatory nature of tax-law provisions, is a national court empowered to refrain from applying the direct provisions of legislation establishing financial sanctions for non-compliance with tax-law requirements and instead apply a lower level of sanctions not provided for by law?

(2)  On the basis of which criteria may the sanction provided for in [section] 17 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On State Regulation of the Production and Circulation of Ethyl, Cognac and Fruit Alcohol, Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco Products, Liquids Used in Electronic Cigarettes, and Fuel’ No. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995 be regarded as constituting a disproportionate interference with the right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention?”

THE BACKGROUND AND THE DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS

10.  The questions put to the Court arise in the context of proceedings pending before the Supreme Court. The parties to that dispute are, on the one hand, the private company OvruchHazAvto (“the company”), a retailer of fuel and alcoholic beverages, and, on the other, the Main Department of the State Tax Service of the Zhytomyr Region (“the tax authority”).

11.  Those parties are in dispute as to the lawfulness and proportionality of a fine imposed on the company for the offence provided for in section 15 of Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995 on State regulation of the production and circulation of ethyl, cognac and fruit alcohol, alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, liquids used in electronic cigarettes, and fuel (“Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995”).

12.  Domestic legislation requires the retail sale of fuel and alcoholic beverages to be performed using an electronic cash register expressly listed in the appendices to the related licences. Under section 17, subsection 2, point 10 of Law no. 481/95‑VR of 19 December 1995, failure to comply is punishable by a fine amounting to 200% of the value of the goods sold in breach of that requirement, subject to a minimum amount of 10,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH).

13.  In the case in question, the company replaced one of its cash registers that had reached the end of its useful life in January 2023. The new machine was duly registered in advance with the tax authorities, but the company omitted to update the appendices to the licences concerned. Nonetheless, after the relevant authorities renewed the licences in June 2023, the new version of the appendices did indeed contain the tax number of the new cash register.

14.  Following a routine inspection in October 2023, the company was accused of selling fuel and alcoholic beverages between 18 January 2023 and 20 June 2023 using a cash register that was not included in the appendices to the licences for the retail sale of those products. The total amount of the sales concerned came to UAH 31,930,111.30 (approximately 785,000 euros (EUR) as at 20 June 2023).

15.  In its comments to the tax authority, the company, while acknowledging that it had committed the offence in question, requested that the following mitigating circumstances be taken into account: the lack of intent to commit the offence; the human factor, that is, the inattention of its accountant; the absence of any reminder by the relevant authorities about the need to update the licence following a change in cash register; the voluntary rectification of the offending situation; the fact that no harm had been sustained by the State, since there was no debt to be repaid; the company’s good faith in fulfilling its tax obligations; the existence of a high average tax burden in comparison with other taxpayers in similar situations; and, lastly, the disproportionate amount of the sanction in relation to the company’s financial situation.

16.  On 7 November 2023 the tax authority fined the company UAH 63,860,222.48 (approximately EUR 1,640,000 as at that same date) – corresponding to the fixed rate of 200% of the value of the products sold – and noted the lack of mitigating circumstances.

17.  The company brought proceedings against the tax authority in the Administrative Court, seeking to have the tax assessment and the fine set aside as unlawful. It acknowledged that it had unintentionally committed a tax offence, but argued that the amount of the fine was disproportionate and breached the principle of the rule of law, since it amounted to practically three times the book value of its total assets (assessed in the company’s 2023 financial report at UAH 22,576,700 – approximately EUR 580,000 as at 7 November 2023, the date of the authority’s decision). It further asserted that such a sanction contravened the principle, enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution, that legal liability was of an individual nature. On this last point, the company cited a Constitutional Court decision of 15 June 2022 finding Article 485 of the Customs Code “unconstitutional” on that ground, as that Article provided at the relevant time for a fine of 300% of the amount of any unpaid customs duties as the only possible sanction in the event of customs fraud and similar offences (the legislation as currently in force, following amendments on 16 November 2022, provides for a fine of between 50% and 150% of the amount of any unpaid customs duties). The company pointed out that, in reaching the above conclusion, the Constitutional Court had relied on the principles developed by the Court in its case-law. Lastly, the company referred to the Court’s well-established case-law, according to which Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 required that any interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions should entail a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. It emphasised, moreover, that such case-law had to be applied by the domestic courts as a source of law.

18.  The tax authority submitted that the application should be dismissed. It argued that although it had been established that the cash register had been declared to the tax authorities on 7 January 2023, with operations starting on 18 January 2023, the company had nevertheless failed to make the necessary changes to the appendices to the retail licences for fuel and alcoholic beverages within the statutory one-month period.

19.  On 4 July 2024 the Zhytomyr Administrative Court ruled in favour of the company, finding the tax authority’s decision to fine it unlawful and setting the fine aside accordingly. One of the reasons it gave for its decision was that, according to the Court’s case-law, a “fair balance” had to be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, and the requisite balance would not be achieved if the person concerned had to bear an “individual and excessive burden”. It considered that the amount of the fine, which was nearly three times the book value of the company’s assets, was excessive for an offence that had been rectified by the company itself and had caused no harm to the public interest that was commensurate to the severity of the sanction imposed.

20.  On 17 September 2024 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment, restating its reasoning.

21.  The tax authority appealed on points of law. It argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to apply the case-law of the Supreme Court, specifically three judgments (of 20 November 2018, 17 February 2022 and 27 June 2024) relating to similar legal issues. It further maintained that the fine was justified, since the law provided that the information specified in the licence had to be updated within one month of any change, particularly where it concerned the use of a new cash register, and the company’s failure to abide by that rule had been established.

22.  In its submissions, the company sought the dismissal of the appeal. In particular, it argued that the proportionality of fines – a crucial issue in its case – had not been addressed in the three Supreme Court judgments relied on by the authority in support of its appeal. The company also referred to the case-law of the Court.

23.  On 12 November 2024 the Supreme Court, sitting as a three-judge bench, opened proceedings. On 3 July 2025 it referred the matter to the division in charge of taxes, duties and other mandatory payments.

THE REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION

24.  On 4 December 2025 the Supreme Court, sitting as a 13-judge bench, decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court and to stay the proceedings while awaiting the reply. It observed that the aim of the regulations on the production and circulation of alcoholic beverages, tobacco and fuel was to ensure high standards in terms of quality and public-health protection and to combat the illegal production and circulation of such products. It pointed out, however, that in protecting those public interests, the State was required to comply with the principle of proportionality, in line with the Court’s settled case-law under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. With regard to the circumstances of the case in question, it noted in particular that the tax authority had acted in accordance with a clear and mandatory legal provision which left no room for discretion. In its view, however, the fact could not be overlooked that the sanction imposed on the company had far exceeded the amount of fines applicable to more serious offences such as the wholesale or retail trade of alcoholic beverages and fuel without a licence.

25.  The reasons given for the request for an advisory opinion from the Court can be summarised as follows.

26.  The Supreme Court submitted that issues relating to the proportionality of tax penalties, as applied to different categories of business entities, constituted “questions of principle” under the Convention. The Court’s differing findings as to whether or not a sanction of that type was proportionate demonstrated both the complexity of the issue and the need to further refine the assessment criteria.

27.  It further stated that the Court had not yet provided a clear answer to the question whether a national court, having found a particular sanction to be disproportionate, had a choice only between applying the sanction or refraining from applying it (despite a statutory requirement to do so), or whether it could also choose to impose on the taxpayer a more lenient sanction that was not prescribed by law.

28.  With regard to the proportionality of a sanction in the form of either confiscation of the entire amount of cash for failure to declare it when crossing the border, or a fine in the amount of the value of imported goods for breaches of customs rules, the requesting court cited together the judgments in Krayeva v. Ukraine (no. 72858/13, 13 January 2022), Sadocha v. Ukraine (no. 77508/11, 11 July 2019), Myakotin v. Ukraine ([Committee], no. 29389/09, 17 December 2019) and Gyrlyan v. Russia (no. 35943/15, 9 October 2018). It then mentioned a second group of cases concerning the proportionality of sanctions in the form of confiscation of goods or fines for breaches of tax legislation or building regulations, namely Aktiva DOO v. Serbia (no. 23079/11, 19 January 2021), S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania (no. 15553/15, 27 June 2023) and Valico S.r.l. v. Italy ((dec.), no. 70074/01, ECHR 2006-III). Lastly, it referred to the judgments in Silvester’s Horeca Service v. Belgium (no. 47650/99, 4 March 2004) and Segame SA v. France (no. 4837/06, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).

DOMESTIC LEGISLATION

29.  Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995 lays down the main principles of State policy on the regulation of the production, export, import and wholesale and retail trade of ethyl alcohol; cognac and fruit and grain distillates; rectified ethyl alcohol from grapes; rectified ethyl alcohol from fruit; grape-alcohol distillate; raw-fruit alcohol; bioethanol; alcoholic beverages; tobacco products; liquids used in electronic cigarettes; and fuel. Its purpose is to ensure the high quality of such products and to protect public health, as well as to strengthen action in the territory of Ukraine against the illegal production and circulation of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, liquids used in electronic cigarettes, and fuel.

30.  According to the definition given in section 1 of Law no. 481/95-VR, a licence (special permit) is a document certifying the right of a business entity to carry out one of the types of activities specified in the Law for a set period.

31.  In accordance with section 15 of Law no. 481/95-VR, in the appendix to the licence for retail trade in alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, liquids used in electronic cigarettes, and fuel, the business entity must indicate the address of the place of trade and provide a list of electronic cash registers (which it must previously register with the tax authorities) including the following information: model, modification, serial number, manufacturer, date of manufacture, tax numbers of “software” cash registers, and registration numbers of accounting books for settlement transactions kept at the place of trade.

32.  The provisions of that same section specify that in the event of any change to the information indicated in a licence issued to a business entity, that entity is obliged to report the change within one month to the authority that issued the licence. The licensing authority, on the basis of an application from the business entity, then issues an amended licence taking those changes into account, within three working days.

33.  In accordance with section 17, subsection 2, point 10, of Law no. 481/95-VR, any company that engages in the retail trade of alcoholic beverages or fuel using an electronic cash register that is not specified in the licence will be fined in the amount of 200% of the value of the products sold using such a machine, subject to a minimum amount of UAH 10,000.

34.  Any actions by the supervisory authority regarding the application of the sanctions provided for by the Law are carried out exclusively under the powers defined by Law no. 481/95-VR and the Ukrainian Tax Code. In particular, sections 15 and 17 of the Law expressly oblige business entities to comply with the requirement to indicate any cash registers in the licence, failing which they will face a fixed financial sanction.

35.  Furthermore, other provisions within section 17 of Law no. 481/95‑VR of 19 December 1995 prescribe sanctions for the production of fuel without a licence (fine of UAH 1,000,000), the wholesale trade or storage of fuel without a licence (fine of UAH 500,000) and the retail sale of fuel without a licence (fine of UAH 250,000).

36.  In accordance with Article 109 of the Ukrainian Tax Code, any breaches of tax legislation or the requirements of other legislation, compliance with which is monitored by the supervisory authorities, will entail liability as provided for under that Code and other laws of Ukraine.

THE COURT’S OPINION

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

37.  The Court finds it useful to restate here that the aim of the advisory procedure is to further enhance the interaction between the Court and national authorities and thereby reinforce the implementation of the Convention, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as stated in the Preamble to Protocol No. 16. The procedure allows the designated national courts and tribunals to request the Court to give an opinion on “questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the protocols thereto” arising “in the context of a case pending before [them]” (see, as the most recent authority, Advisory opinion on the status of monastic premises and the jurisdiction of the courts to examine a dispute concerning them [GC], request no. P16-2025-001, Ukraine’s Supreme Court, § 48, 5 March 2026 (“Advisory opinion P16‑2025‑001”)).

38.  The aim of the procedure is not to transfer the dispute to the Court, but rather to give the requesting court guidance on Convention issues when determining the case before it. The Court has no jurisdiction either to assess the facts of a case or to evaluate the merits of the parties’ views on the interpretation of domestic law in the light of the Convention, or to rule on the outcome of the proceedings. Its role is limited to providing an opinion in relation to the questions submitted to it. It is for the requesting court or tribunal to resolve the issues raised by the case and to draw, as appropriate, the conclusions which flow from the opinion delivered by the Court for the provisions of national law invoked in the case and for the outcome of the case (ibid., § 49).

39.  It follows from Article 1 §§ 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 16 that the opinions the Court delivers under this Protocol “must be confined to points that are directly connected to the proceedings pending at domestic level”. Their value also lies in providing national courts with guidance on questions of principle relating to the Convention applicable in similar cases (ibid., § 50).

40.  In formulating its opinion, the Court will take due account of the written observations and documents submitted in the course of the proceedings before it. Nevertheless, the Court’s task is not to reply to all the grounds and arguments submitted to it or to set out in detail the basis for its reply. The Court has the power to reformulate or to combine questions asked by the requesting court, having regard to the specific factual and legal circumstances in issue in the domestic proceedings (see Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC], request no. P16‑2018‑001, French Court of Cassation, §§ 26-33, 10 April 2019 (“Advisory opinion P16-2018-001”), and Advisory opinion concerning the use of the “blanket reference” or “legislation by reference” technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law [GC], request no. P16-2019-001, Armenian Constitutional Court, §§ 44-45 (“Advisory opinion P16-2019-001”)). It may also formulate its replies as it deems appropriate (see Advisory opinion P16-2018-001, cited above, §§ 27-34). Under Protocol No. 16, the Court’s role is not to rule in adversarial proceedings on contentious applications by means of a binding judgment but rather, within as short a time frame as possible, to provide the requesting court or tribunal with guidance enabling it to ensure respect for Convention rights when determining the case before it (ibid., § 51; see also Advisory opinion P16-2019-001, cited above, § 51).

THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE SUPREME COURT

41.  The Court notes that the two questions which have been put to it essentially concern the interpretation and application of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, although some other provisions of the Convention are referred to in the comments of the Supreme Court.

42.  In the view of the Court, it is therefore appropriate, in giving the present opinion, to remain primarily within the framework of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This approach does not prevent consideration from being given to cross-cutting concepts within the Convention that might contribute to the guidance provided to the requesting court.

43.  Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

44.  The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers the deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose. However, the rules are not “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (see, in particular, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, § 1437, 9 July 2025; G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, § 293, 28 June 2018; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, § 93, 25 October 2012; and James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 37, Series A no. 98).

45.  The domestic dispute currently pending before the Supreme Court originated in the fine of UAH 63,860,222.48 imposed on the company by the tax authority.

46.  The Court has previously accepted that the imposition of a fine will in principle constitute interference with the right guaranteed by the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as it deprives the person concerned of a “possession”, namely the sum that has to be paid (see, in particular, Krayeva, cited above, § 23; DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, no. 97/11, § 125, 2 October 2014; Mamidakis v. Greece, no. 35533/04, § 44, 11 January 2007; Valico S.r.l., cited above; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, § 50, ECHR 2001-VII; and James and Others, cited above, § 37, in which the Court reaffirmed some of the principles it had established in its judgment in Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, § 61, Series A no. 52).

47.  As to the provision of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 under which such an interference should be examined, the Court’s case-law indicates that an interference of this kind generally needs to be justified under the second paragraph of that Article, which expressly provides for an exception in respect of the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

48.  Section 15 of Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995 could therefore be termed a means of controlling the use of property in accordance with the general interest, and it is in the light of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the resulting interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions of the company concerned could, accordingly, be analysed. However, as previously noted (see paragraph 44 above), although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules, the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, and should be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (for an illustration of this in relation to tax, see, for example, “Bulves” AD v. Bulgaria, no. 3991/03, § 61, 22 January 2009, and S.A. Dangeville v. France, no. 36677/97, § 51, ECHR 2002-III).

49.  As the Court has stated on a number of occasions, this does not, however, mean that the issue is beyond scrutiny, as it must be verified whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been correctly applied (see DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s., cited above, § 125; Valico S.r.l., cited above; and Orion‑Břeclav, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 43783/98, 13 January 2004). To decide whether the interference in issue may be deemed compatible with that Article, an examination comprising several steps should be carried out. Any interference by a public authority with the rights protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 must above all be lawful. It must also pursue a legitimate aim in the general interest and be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised (see, among many other authorities, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, § 1438). Although the questions asked by the requesting court mainly concern this last point – namely, the review of proportionality – they also implicitly yet necessarily refer to the lawfulness of the interference in issue and to the general-interest aim pursued. These two factors must be examined before any review of proportionality can take place.

50.  Furthermore, the Court reiterates that in the context of a request for an advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16, it has the power to reformulate or to combine questions asked by the requesting court, and to formulate its replies as it deems appropriate (see paragraph 40 above). In this specific instance, it sees fit to reverse the order in which it will examine the requesting court’s questions by first addressing the second question, which relates to the stage at which the courts assess the proportionality of the interference. The Court will then turn to the requesting court’s first question, which pertains to the power of a domestic court to refrain from applying the sanction prescribed by law, in favour of a lesser sanction not provided for in the relevant legislation. It is only where a domestic court finds a statutory sanction disproportionate, as part of that assessment, that the issue raised in the first question might become relevant.

51.  In formulating its opinion, having regard to the need for a sincere and loyal dialogue between international and national courts and to the usefulness that this opinion is intended to have (see paragraph 11 of the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16), the Court will first offer guidance on the lawfulness of the interference and on the general-interest aim pursued. It will then address the requesting court’s second question more specifically, reiterating certain general principles to be applied in examining the proportionality of an interference and potential criteria to be taken into account in that regard.

52.  The Court would, however, emphasise at this juncture that it is for the national authorities to decide what kind of taxes or other contributions or penalties are to be collected. As decisions in that area commonly involve an assessment of political, economic and social questions which the Convention leaves within the competence of the Contracting States, the domestic policy‑maker should be afforded a particularly broad margin of appreciation (see, in particular, Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 106, 11 December 2018; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 98; DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s., cited above, § 126; R.Sz. v. Hungary, no. 41838/11, § 38, 2 July 2013; Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 23 February 1995, § 60, Series A no. 306-B; and AGOSI v. the United Kingdom, 24 October 1986, § 52, Series A no. 108). It follows that the legislature’s assessment should be respected in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation (see S.C. Zorina International S.R.L., cited above, § 41, and National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 23 October 1997, § 80, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII).

The second question

53.  As indicated in paragraph 49 in fine above, the Court considers it essential to address the lawfulness and the legitimate aim of the interference before turning to the proportionality issue.

Lawfulness of the interference

54.  The Court reiterates that the first and most important requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful. Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see, in particular, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, § 1438; G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others, cited above, § 292; Lekić, cited above, § 94; and Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II).

55.  The principle of lawfulness also presupposes a certain quality of the applicable provisions of domestic law (see, among many other authorities, James and Others, cited above, § 67). In this regard, it should be noted that when speaking of “law”, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term (see, for example, Lekić, cited above, § 95, and Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 96). Moreover, the Court reiterates the principle that the Convention must be read as a whole and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (see, for example, M.A. v. Denmark [GC], no. 6697/18, § 144, 9 July 2021, and Advisory opinion P16-2025-001, cited above, § 65).

56.  Thus, under Article 7, to which the requesting court referred in its request for an advisory opinion, the Court has pointed out on many occasions that when speaking of “law”, that provision alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises written as well as unwritten law and implies qualitative requirements, notably those of accessibility and foreseeability (see, for example, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, § 1262, 25 June 2024, and Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, § 238, 26 September 2023). Similarly, the Court has consistently held that it is not, in principle, its task to substitute itself for the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation, the Court’s role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see, among other authorities, Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04, § 197, ECHR 2010, and Korbely v. Hungary [GC], no. 9174/02, §§ 72-73, ECHR 2008).

57.  It follows that the legal norms upon which the interference giving rise to the Supreme Court’s advisory-opinion request is based should in any event be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application (see Lekić, cited above, § 95, and Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 97).

58.  As to the notion of “foreseeability”, its scope depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see Lekić, cited above, § 97, and Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 97; see also, in the context of Article 7, Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 35343/05, § 157, ECHR 2015, and Cantoni v. France, 15 November 1996, § 35, Reports 1996-V).

59.  In particular, a norm is “foreseeable” when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities (see Lekić, cited above, § 95; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 143, ECHR 2012; and Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 97).

60.  The domestic courts must therefore endeavour, in particular, to clarify the question of the lawfulness of the interference. In other words, as the Court stated in Iatridis (cited above, § 58), “the issue of whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights becomes relevant only once it has been established that the interference in question satisfied the requirement of lawfulness and was not arbitrary”.

61.  Having regard to the circumstances of the present matter, and in view of the parties’ arguments before the domestic courts – particularly those of the company, which acknowledged that it had committed the offence in question (see paragraph 15 above) – the Court notes that the domestic courts found that the acts in issue constituted the offence provided for in section 15 of Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995 (contrast Krayeva, cited above, § 26) in relation to the requirement for the retail sale of fuel and alcoholic beverages to be performed using an electronic cash register expressly listed in the appendices to the related licences (see, in the same vein, Gyrlyan, cited above, § 22). That has not, moreover, been disputed by the company in the present proceedings.

62.  In accordance with the Court’s case-law, the requesting court should also examine whether the rules in question were formulated with sufficient precision and thus met the qualitative requirement of foreseeability, particularly with regard to the issue – central to the present matter – of the sanction provided for in domestic law (see, in particular, Sadocha, cited above, § 25).

63.  In this connection, as the Court has pointed out (see paragraph 58 above), the scope of the notion of “foreseeability” depends in particular on the status of those to whom the instrument defining the offence is addressed. Accordingly, the requesting court could take account of the fact that a law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. This is particularly true with regard to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They, as with the company fined in the proceedings giving rise to the present request, can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails (see Lekić, cited above, § 97; Microintelect OOD v. Bulgaria, no. 34129/03, § 43, 4 March 2014; and Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH, cited above, § 70; see also, with regard to Article 7, Vasiliauskas, cited above, § 157, and Cantoni, cited above, § 35; and, in the context of Article 10, NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 28470/12, § 161, 5 April 2022).

Legitimate aim in the general interest

64.  The Court notes that the purpose of Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995, which lays down the main principles of State policy on the regulation of the production, export, import and wholesale and retail trade of certain products, including alcohol and fuel, is to ensure the high quality of such products and to protect public health, as well as to strengthen action in the territory of Ukraine against the illegal production and circulation of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, liquids used in electronic cigarettes, and fuel (see paragraph 29 above). In its decision of 4 December 2025, the Supreme Court observed that the aim of those regulations was indeed to ensure high standards in terms of quality and public-health protection and to combat the illegal production and circulation of such products (see paragraph 24 above).

65.  Any control of the use of property by a public authority can only be justified if it serves a legitimate aim in the general interest. Domestic courts must examine this issue when called upon to assess compliance with the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

Proportionality of the interference

66.  The Court considers that the second question that has been asked in the context of the present request for an advisory opinion cannot be addressed in relation to the specific provisions of Ukrainian Law no. 481/95-VR of 19 December 1995 (see paragraph 9 above). The Court reiterates that in the context of proceedings under Protocol No. 16, it is not its function to pronounce on the interpretation of the relevant domestic law in light of the relevant principles and requirements of the Convention. That is a matter falling under the jurisdiction of the requesting court, which the Court cannot replace (see paragraph 38 above). Nor, through its reply to a request for an advisory opinion, can the Court decide the concrete case underlying the request. Nevertheless, without adjudicating on the pending dispute or prejudging the outcome of the related proceedings, the Court will indicate certain criteria which can provide general guidance to the requesting court.

67.  The Court has emphasised on many occasions the need to strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights (see Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 60642/08, § 108, ECHR 2014, and Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 107, ECHR 2000-I). This fair balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention, and requires ascertaining whether the person concerned had to bear an “individual and excessive burden”. This is the case, in particular, where the fine imposed fundamentally interferes with the financial position of the person concerned (see, in particular, S.C. Zorina International S.R.L., cited above, § 43, and Valico S.r.l., cited above).

68.  In order to be proportionate, the interference should correspond to the severity of the infringement, and the sanction to the gravity of the offence it is designed to punish (see Sadocha, cited above, § 31; Gyrlyan, cited above, § 28; and Gabrić v. Croatia, no. 9702/04, § 39, 5 February 2009). In the matter at hand, that offence is the sale of fuel and alcoholic beverages using a cash register that was not expressly listed in the appendices to the licence.

69.  The Court’s case-law does not offer an exhaustive set of criteria to be applied in any given situation, especially since no single approach can be taken in examining the issues submitted to the domestic courts of the High Contracting Parties on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Court has regard to the specific circumstances of the case, that is, the concrete facts of the case as established by the national courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Advisory opinion P16-2019-001, cited above, § 86).

70.  For the purposes of the present opinion, the Court will indicate below certain criteria that may prove relevant for an examination of the fair balance which must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 67 above).

Choice of means employed to achieve the aim(s) pursued and their appropriateness to those aims

71.  Concerning the choice of means, it may be relevant for the proportionality assessment to examine whether, as the requesting court suggested, other, more lenient measures could reasonably have been taken in pursuit of the general-interest aim sought (see, for example, Aktiva DOO, cited above, § 84; see also, regarding the possibility of less restrictive alternative measures, G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others, cited above, § 301).

72.  However, as the Court has had occasion to reiterate, the possible existence of alternative solutions does not in itself render the means employed by the national legislature unjustified. Provided that the legislature remains within the bounds of its margin of appreciation, and therefore that the measures chosen correspond to the legitimate aims pursued by the law, the review required by the Convention does not go so far as to examine whether the legislation represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way (see, in particular, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece (dec.), nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12, § 48, 7 May 2013; J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. the United Kingdom, no. 44302/02, § 45, 15 November 2005; and James and Others, cited above, § 51; see also Advisory opinion on the difference in treatment between landowners’ associations “having a recognised existence on the date of the creation of an approved municipal hunters’ association” and landowners’ associations set up after that date [GC], request no. P16-2021-002, French Conseil d’État, §§ 104-05, 13 July 2022 (“Advisory opinion P16‑2021‑002”)).

73.  It is nevertheless necessary on each occasion to examine the circumstances of the case, for example where the authorities cite the need to compensate for damage sustained by the State (see Sadocha, cited above, § 32, and Gyrlyan, cited above, § 29) or grave economic consequences (see Aktiva DOO, cited above, § 80). In this connection, the Court reiterates that even where the amount of actual damage incurred by the State is very small, regard has to be had to the more general context and to the State’s policy at the relevant time, in the light of the legitimate general-interest aim pursued (see S.C. Zorina International S.R.L., cited above, § 50).

74.  In addition, regardless of whether there has been any harm to the State or to a right protected by specific legislation, the issue whether any given conduct should be punished by a financial penalty with a deterrent effect such as a fine comes within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation (see Valico S.r.l., cited above, and S.C. Complex Herta Import Export S.R.L. Lipova v. Romania, no. 17118/04, § 37, 18 June 2013).

Impact of the means employed on the company in question

75.  As part of the pending proceedings and in its submissions to the Court, the company reproduced the comments it had initially sent to the tax authority concerning the amount of the fine (representing 200% of the value of the goods sold in breach of the legal requirement), once again asserting that the payment of such a sum could have irreversible consequences for its operations. In its judgment of 4 July 2024, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal, the Zhytomyr Administrative Court confirmed that the amount in question was nearly three times the book value of the company’s assets (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above).

76.  The Court has, however, previously found that very large fines are not necessarily disproportionate in themselves (see, for example, DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s., cited above, §§ 129‑30, and Valico S.r.l., cited above).

77.  The issue whether a measure which restricts the use of property could entail the – permanent or temporary – loss of a possible “tool of one’s trade” may be taken into account when deciding whether the fair balance required by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been upset (see, among other authorities, mutatis mutandis, Advisory opinion P16-2021-002, cited above, § 108).

78.  In Mamidakis (cited above, § 47), after noting that the applicant had been fined a total amount of several million euros – and, moreover, had been found jointly liable for the payment of fines imposed on other persons – the Court observed that the amounts were extremely high, representing as much as ten times the taxes levied on the undeclared goods. That situation had led some dissenting domestic judges to conclude that there was an excessive burden, even for very large companies, and that there had been a de facto confiscation of the applicant’s property.

Conduct of the company

79.  According to the Court’s case-law, the assessment of the relevant circumstances may include the conduct of the person punished (see, among other authorities, Krayeva, cited above, §§ 27 and 30). As noted above (see paragraph 68 above), in order to be proportionate, the interference should correspond to the severity of the infringement, and the sanction to the gravity of the offence it is designed to punish – in the case at hand, failure to comply with the declaration requirement – rather than to the gravity of any presumed infringement which has not actually been established, such as an offence of money laundering or tax evasion (see, for example, Gyrlyan, cited above, § 28).

80.  In this connection, the Court’s case-law gives particular weight to whether an offence was committed in the context of legal or illegal activities. In Aktiva DOO (cited above, § 83), for example, which concerned the confiscation of goods, the Court stated as follows (internal citations omitted):

“It is important to note that the goods in issue in the present case had been imported lawfully ... This fact distinguishes the instant case from certain other cases in which the confiscation measure applied to goods of which importation was prohibited, which were deemed to have been unlawfully acquired, or which were intended for use in illegal activities, or where confiscation orders had been made in the context of criminal proceedings concerning charges of serious or organised crime and where there was a strong suspicion or certainty confirmed by a judicial decision that the confiscated assets were the proceeds of an offence. Moreover, the Court notes that, despite the seizure of the applicant company’s goods, the authorities did not bring any criminal activities against the applicant company or its managing director other than misdemeanour proceedings which resulted in their acquittal.”

81.  Similarly, in Sadocha (cited above, §§ 28 and 30) and Gyrlyan (cited above, §§ 25-26 and 27), the Court expressly noted that the activities in issue were legal and that there was no indication that the applicants had deliberately sought to circumvent the customs regulations; moreover, the authorities had accepted that there had been no intent to deceive.

82.  Accordingly, the conduct attributed to the persons on whom sanctions have been imposed comes into play in the examination of the fair balance and of the existence of any individual and excessive burden (for fines that did not appear disproportionate, see, for instance, Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, nos. 18640/10 and 4 others, § 199, 4 March 2014), as the lack of intent to deceive may be taken into consideration by the domestic courts.

83.  The fact remains that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not preclude the possibility that merely breaching statutory requirements – such as a failure to display certain information (see S.C. Complex Herta Import Export S.R.L. Lipova, cited above, § 37) or to comply with urban-development regulations (see Valico S.r.l., cited above) – may constitute in itself a violation of the relevant legal rules and give rise to punishment, bearing in mind that the issue whether such conduct should be punished comes within the respondent State’s margin of appreciation (see paragraph 74 above).

The first question

84.  The Convention does not prohibit recourse to automatic sanctions per se. In this connection, the Court observes that the requesting court referred to Article 6 of the Convention in support of its advisory-opinion request, citing Silvester’s Horeca Service (cited above, and particularly §§ 26-30 of that judgment) and Segame SA (cited above, and particularly § 59 of that judgment).

85.  Although the present opinion relates primarily to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 41-42 above), the Court reiterates that the Convention must be read as a whole and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (see paragraph 55 above). The Convention forms an indivisible whole within which the protected rights are interdependent and intertwined.

86.  In any event, the existence of procedural safeguards is an inherent requirement in the protective mechanism of the Convention, which explains why the Court’s case-law under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has similarities with that under Article 6 of the Convention (see, for example, Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine, no. 10233/20, § 52, 6 February 2025). As pointed out by the requesting court, the Court has indeed held, for example, that a system of administrative fines is not incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention so long as taxpayers can bring any such decision affecting them before a court that affords the safeguards of that provision (see Segame SA, cited above, § 54; Silvester’s Horeca Service, cited above, § 25; and Bendenoun v. France, 24 February 1994, § 46, Series A no. 284).

87.  With regard more specifically to Silvester’s Horeca Service (cited above), to which the requesting court referred first of all, the Court was called upon to examine the jurisdiction of the domestic courts dealing with a challenge to a decision imposing administrative tax fines. It found that the company concerned had not had access to a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, since the courts’ jurisdiction was limited to ascertaining whether the offences had actually been committed and the fines lawfully imposed, without their being able to assess the appropriateness or the amount of those fines, or to verify whether they were proportionate to the offences committed (ibid., §§ 28-30).

88.  Subsequently, however, the Court made an important clarification in Segame SA (cited above). That case, to which the requesting court referred in relation to Article 6 of the Convention, concerned an alleged lack of access to a court with full jurisdiction, for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, to challenge tax penalties. The Court noted that the applicant company had been able to lodge an application with the Administrative Court, which had broad powers. Unlike in Silvester’s Horeca Service (cited above), the Administrative Court could exempt the taxpayer from the disputed taxes and penalties or modify the amount thereof within the limits prescribed by law, and where penalties were concerned, it could lower the rate, at least within the limits of the applicable legal provisions (see Segame SA, cited above, §§ 56-57). The Court also expressly referred to the special need for fiscal measures to be sufficiently effective to preserve the interests of the State, and to the fact that such cases differed from the hard core of criminal law for the purposes of the Convention (see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, § 43, ECHR 2006-XIV). Furthermore, it examined the rate of the fine applied in the case before it, which was fixed at 25% of the unpaid tax, and found that it was not disproportionate, unlike in Mamidakis (cited above), which concerned an alleged interference with the rights secured under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and in which a violation had been found (see Segame SA, cited above, § 59; regarding Mamidakis, cited above, see, in particular, paragraph 78 above).

89.  In particular, in Segame SA, regarding the automatic nature of a tax penalty and the inability of the administrative courts to vary its amount in the absence of any legal provision to that effect, the Court found that the law itself, to a certain degree, made the fine proportionate to the seriousness of the taxpayer’s conduct, by expressing it as a percentage of the unpaid tax, the calculation of which the applicant company had had ample opportunity to discuss in that case (see Segame SA, cited above, § 59, and, mutatis mutandis, Valico S.r.l., cited above).

90.  In its request for an advisory opinion, the requesting court nonetheless asked the Court whether a national court is empowered to refrain from applying the direct provisions of legislation establishing financial sanctions for non‑compliance with tax-law requirements and instead to apply a lower level of sanctions not provided for by law (see paragraph 9 above).

91.  The solution to such a problem, however, can only be found in the domestic legal system in which that problem arises, through the application of any relevant mechanisms that may be available under domestic law. The Court’s task in the present advisory proceedings is not to determine whether domestic law empowers courts to reduce or otherwise adjust the sanction in question, nor to identify the particular mechanism through which compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is to be secured. To this end, various mechanisms can be found among the Contracting States to the Convention. These include powers of assessment and adjustment conferred on the courts and review by the constitutional court. Also, the legislature itself may ensure respect for proportionality directly through the statutory framework. In principle, the choice of means to ensure that the State complies with its obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is a matter falling within its competence. For its part, the Court would make clear that, particularly in the context of a request for an advisory opinion, it must avoid any unjustified interference in the exercise by the States of their judicial functions or in the organisation of their judicial systems (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 94, 20 October 2011, and Allègre v. France, no. 22008/12, § 63, 12 July 2018).

92.  The Court would further observe that what is at issue in the proceedings now pending at the domestic level can be distinguished from what was examined in Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine (cited above). There, the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention rested on the fact that the domestic court had given a new interpretation of a clear and unambiguous statutory provision laying down time-limits for the notarisation of mortgage documents. This interpretation of a provision that left no room for interpretation (as also confirmed by the Constitutional Court) was to the detriment of the applicant company, in the context of proceedings brought against it by a bank following the company’s failure to repay a loan. The Court regarded the change in the interpretation of the statutory provision, which it described as a radical change, as more akin to a statutory amendment than to the resolution by the domestic court of a problem of case-law divergence. This change had been made without any compelling reason, and without regard to its effects on legal certainty. The proceedings that have given rise to the present request differ significantly, in particular in terms of context (enforcement of the law by the fiscal authorities) and substance (a challenge by the company to the proportionality of a high fine resulting from the application of the formula prescribed by law).

93.  The Court would emphasise that the obligation to ensure observance of the rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 rests with the domestic legal system as a whole, operating in accordance with the rule of law and affording safeguards capable of preventing a disproportionate burden in the circumstances of the case. The relevant question is not whether a particular safeguard takes a specific institutional form, but whether the legal framework, viewed as a whole, contains mechanisms capable of preventing an individual from having to bear a disproportionate burden.

94.  The Convention does not prescribe the mechanism through which proportionality is to be secured. Compatibility with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not depend on the mechanism chosen, but on whether the legal framework, viewed as a whole, affords safeguards capable of preventing disproportionate burdens. Moreover, as long as the legislature has remained within the limits of its margin of appreciation, the review required by the Convention does not go so far as to examine whether better alternative measures could have been found (see, mutatis mutandis, Constantinou and Others v. Cyprus, nos. 77396/14 and 4 others, § 130, 13 November 2025, and the cases cited therein). Whether the proportionality requirement should be satisfied by means such as those enumerated at paragraph 91 above, or by other appropriate means, is a choice to be made by the Contracting States. To conclude, the Convention neither confers on domestic courts, nor requires that they be conferred with, any particular power of adjustment. Whether such a power exists under domestic law is a matter for the domestic legal order.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Delivers the following opinion:

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions be lawful and serve a legitimate aim. The Contracting States must ensure that in their domestic legal systems, taken as a whole, there are safeguards capable of preventing a disproportionate burden in the circumstances of each case. As regards the imposition of financial sanctions for non-compliance with tax law requirements, it must be ensured that a fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. This entails determining whether the person concerned had to bear an individual and excessive burden. In this respect, decisions in the area of taxes or other contributions or penalties commonly involve an assessment of political, economic and social questions, which the Convention leaves within the competence of the Contracting States. This justifies affording the domestic policy-maker a particularly broad margin of appreciation.

While the Court’s case-law provides many examples of criteria for assessing the proportionality of a statutory sanction, it does not offer an exhaustive set to be applied in any given situation. The selection of the criteria applicable in any concrete case depends on the assessment of all relevant circumstances of that case. What is decisive from the standpoint of the Convention is that the domestic legal framework, viewed as a whole, be capable of preventing disproportionate outcomes in individual cases.

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention does not prescribe the mechanism through which proportionality is to be secured. It does not prohibit the existence of automatic sanctions prescribed by law to punish certain conduct – provided, however, that the statutory sanction itself is already proportionate.

Ensuring compliance with this provision does not depend on the mechanism chosen, but on whether the legal framework, viewed as a whole, affords safeguards capable of preventing disproportionate burdens. The choice of appropriate means in this respect is for the Contracting States to make. The Convention neither confers on domestic courts, nor requires that they be conferred with, any particular power of adjustment. Whether such a power exists under domestic law is a matter for the domestic legal order.

Done in English and French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 29 September 2026.

John Darcy Mattias Guyomar

Deputy to the Registrar President